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The far-reaching social consequences arising from the interplay of
powerful economic forces and the judicial function of interpreting the phrase
"due process of law" has been a deservedly popular theme for commentators
on American constitutional history and law. The supposed need for more
efficient judicial protection against burdensome, and frequently ill-advised,
restrictions imposed by state lawmakers in their efforts to control public
utilities and curb the growing power of corporate wealth was found, after
considerable hesitation, in the cabalistic words of the Fourteenth Amendment
which were specifically made applicable to state action.'
The significance of the discovery by the Supreme Court of the United
States that the due process clause could be utilized as a constitutional restraint upon the substance of legislation 2 as well as upon forms and modes
of procedure, and for the protection of the property of corporations as well
tA. B., 1921, A.M., 1924, Ph. D., 1931, Columbia University; LL.B., 1917, University
of Texas; Professor of Law, University of Idaho; member of the Texas and New York
bars; author of CRImINAL JusTICE IN ENGLAND: A STUDY IN LAW ADMINISTRATION (1931),
and of articles in legal periodicals.
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c. XCI; Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (Ign) 24
HARv. L. REv. 366, 46o; The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendmwnt (1909) 7 MICH.
L. REv. 643. It was in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877) that the Supreme Court
indulged in dicta to the effect that substantive rights of life, liberty and property are protected against legislative deprivation by the due process clause.
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as of natural persons, 3 was never greater than today, when the opinions of
the Court reveal a steady absorption of its time with problems arising out of
attempted governmental control over economic enterprise, industrial organization and personal freedom. The tremendous importance of the Supreme
Court as the arbiter of the relations between the individual and the government and between the states and the nation has been forcibly and frequently
commented upon by many able students of our constitutional law and need
not be dwelt upon here.4 "Whatever the theory," says Professor Thomas
' Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific R. R., 118 U. S. 394, 6 Sup. Ct. 1132 (1886) ; Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198 (1896) ; Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898) ; Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto
Exchange Corp., 262 U. S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 636 (1923).
'See, for example, for various aspects of the subject, McGEEE, DUE PRocEsS OF
LAW (i9o6); TAYLOR, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1917); MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LA.v
(1926); HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1910); 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) c. xci-cv; BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AmERI
CAN CONSTITUTION (1922)

c. xxvi-xxxii; COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (189); 3
WmARRN. THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922)
C. xxxv-xxxviii;
WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1925); FRANKFURTER
AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927); CoXE, JUDICIAL PowER AND
THE STATES

(1'912)

; GUTHRIE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION (1893)

; MEIGS, RELATION OF THE JUDICIARY TO THE CON-

STITUTION (1919); CORIi, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEv (1914) ; HAiNES, THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1914) ; GooDNow, SoCIAL REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1911) ; McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927) ; MooRE THE SuPREM
COURT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION (1913); THOMPSON, FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION'
(1923) ; McLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND PARTIES (1912) ; Pound, Lib-

erty of Contract (19o9) 18 YALE L. J. 454; Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fburtientli
Amendment (1909) 7 MICH. L. REv. 643; Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and'Realism in Constitutional Law' (1916) 29 HARv. L. REV. 353; Kales, New Methods in Due Prdcess-Cases
(1918) 12 Am1. PoL. ScI. REV. 241; Warren, The New Liberty undei, the Fourteenth
Amendment (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 431; Hough, Due Process of Law-Today (IbI9)
32 HARV. L. REV. 218; Cuihman, Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1922) 20 MICH. L. REV. 737; Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and
the Supreme Court (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 943; Spahr, Natural Law, Due Process,'and
Economic Pressure (1930) 24 Am. Poi. Sm. REV. 332; Willis, Due Process of Ldw undi
the United States Constitution (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 331; Cantor, Law and the Social
Sciences (193o) 16 A. B. A. J. 385; Lewis, Adaptation of the Law to Changing Economic
Conditions (1925) II A. B.,A. J. II; Brown, Police Power-Legislation for Health and
Personal Safety (1929) 42 HARv. L, REv. 866; Waite, Judicial Statesmen (1922) 8 A. B.
A. J. 375; Colvin, Liberty and Police Power; or Rules for the Legal Life (1927) 13 A. B.
A. J. II; Dodd, Social Legislation and the Courts (1913) 28 POL. Sci. Q. I; Swayze, Judicial
Construction of the Fourteenth Ainendinent (1912) 26 HARv. L. REv. I; Bird, The Evolution.
of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court (1913) 13 COL.
L. REv. 37; Greeley, The Changing Attitude of the Courts Toward Social Legislation (191o)
5 ILL. L. REv. 222; Dobyns, Justice Holnes and the Fourteenth Anendment (1918) 13 ILL.
L. REV. 71; Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Hohnes (1916) 29 HARv.
L. REV. 683; Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holines' ConstitutionalOpinions (1923) 36 HARv.
L. REv. 909; Mr. Justice Holnes and the Constitution (1927) 41 HARV. L. REv. 121; Cushman, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court (1921) 19 MICH. L. REv.
771; Freund, ConstitutionalLimitations and Labor Legislation (1910) 4 ILL. L. REV. 609;
Wickersham. The Police Power, A Product of the Rule of Reason (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv.
297; Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day (1908) 21 HARV. L. REV. 495;
Powell, The Supreme Court's Adjudication of ConstitutionalIssues in 1921-1922 (1922-23)
21 MICH. L. REv. 63, 174, 290, 437, 542; Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Immigration Proceedings (1909) 22 HARv. L. REv. 36o; Administrative Exercise of the Police
Power (1911) 24 HARv. L. REV. 268, 333, 441; The ConstitutionalIssue in Minimuin Wage
Legislation (1917) 2 MINN. L. REV. I; The Workmenv's Compensation Cases (1917) 32 POL.
Sc. Q. 542; The Oregon Minimnum Wage Cases (1917) 32 PoL. SCI. Q. 296. For a recent
popular but brilliant analysis of the subject see Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the
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Reed Powell in words of realistic summary, "the fact is that the Supreme
Court of the United States can pass on the reasonableness of the police
measures of every state and city in the land." "
The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court during the October term,
1930, in cases where the constitutionality of state action was challenged on
the ground that it violated the due process of law or the equal protection
of the laws guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment furnish interesting
material for a study of the operation of the judicial process. The decisions
are of interest not only because of the intrinsic importance of the issues
presented in some of the cases, but because they may be said to embody, in a
very real sense, the social and economic outlook of a recently reconstituted
bench. 6 The analyst of these opinions who is bold enough to venture into
the domain of prophecy certainly has no inconsiderable basis for the prediction that the presence on the bench of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and of
Mr. Justice Roberts will exert in the immediate future a profound influence
upon the course of legal statesmanship.
The cases decided during this somewhat limited period of time in which
the task was imposed upon the Court of construing either one or both of
the above-mentioned clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment may be divided
roughly into two groups: (i) those passing upon the constitutionality of
state taxation laws, and (2) those determining the validity of state action
of either a legislative or administrative character in aid of the exercise of
its police power and designed to promote some phase of the public welfare,
or to remedy some particular evil. 7 The latter classification, while exceedingly comprehensive and indefinite, will serve well enough for purposes of
this discussion.
State Taxation Laws
Throughout the consideration of the cases presented in this section it
should be borne in mind that state tax laws are often challenged in the
Supreme Court on grounds other than the deprivation of property without
due process of law or the denial of the equal protection of the laws. Not
infrequently such legislation is attacked on the theory that it is contrary
to some specific act of Congress, or because it imposes burdens upon the
federal government or its instrumentalities, or because it constitutes a burden
upon interstate commerce. Only those cases in which it has been urged
Tlw Supreme Court and State Police Power, r922-193o (1931) 17 VA. L. R-v. 529.
For other installments of Professor Powell's scholarly and comprehensive study see ibid.
653, iS ibid. i.
'Mr. Chief Justice Hughes was sworn into office on February 24, 1930; Mr. justice
Roberts was not sworn in until June 2, i93o, and was therefore unable to participate in the
work of the Court during the 1929 term.
Only those cases in which the Court delivered opinions are here considered.
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that state action was invalid under the due process or the equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are considered here.s
State legislative regulation of chain stores has generally taken the
form of an occupation tax on the business of retail selling, measured by the
gross volume of sales of all stores operated by a single owner, or a license
tax computed upon the basis of the number of stores operated by a single
owner.9 The constitutionality of legislation imposing graduated license fees
upon chain store operators in Indiana was passed upon in State Board of Tax
Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson.10 The statute challenged in this case
made the operation of any store without a license, to be renewed annually, a
misdemeanor."- The license fees, under section 5 of the Act, were graduated
as follows:
"(i) Upon one store, the annual license fee shall be three dollars
for each such store; (2)Upon two stores or more, but not to exceed
five stores, the annual license fee shall be ten dollars for each such additional store; (3) Upon each store in excess of five, but not to exceed
ten, the annual license fee shall be fifteen dollars for each such additional
store; (4) Upon each store in excess of ten, but not to exceed twenty,
the annual license fee shall be twenty dollars for each such additional
store; (5) Upon each store in excess of twenty, the annual license
fee shall be twenty-five dollars for each such additional store."
The United States district court for the southern district of Indiana had
entered a decree perpetually enjoining the enforcement of the law on the
2
ground that it was offensive to both the federal and state constitutions.'
The appellee, who was a wholesale and retail grocer and meat dealer operating
two hundred and twenty-five chain stores in the city of Indianapolis, with a
capital investment of more than $2oo,ooo and annual sales of more than

$i,ooo,ooo, had contested the validity of that portion of the Act set forth
above on the ground that it was an unreasonable and arbitrary classification
for purposes of taxation and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The Court, however, by a five to four division of its members, declined to
accept such a view.
In an opinion which carefully reviewed previous pertinent decisions of
the Court, Mr. Justice Roberts emphasized that it was not the Court's function to consider the propriety or justness of the tax, or to seek for the
motives, or to criticize the public policy that prompted the enactment of the
'For a review of all taxation cases decided by the Court during the 1929 term, see
HANKIN,
PROGRESS OF THE LAW IN THE U. S. SUPREME: COURT, 1929-I930 (1930) c. vii-viii.
9

See Note (1931) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 289; Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 431; Note
(i93i) 31 COL. L. REv. 145; Note (1931) 17 IOWA L. REV. 72.
10283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (93I), noted in (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1040, (1931) 17
IOWA L. REv. 72, (1931) 18 VA. L. REv. 72, (1931) 20 GEo. L. REv. 87. See also (1931) 31
COL. L. REv. 145, (1931) 15 MIN. L. REV. 341, (ig31) 44 HARV. L. REV. 1295.
'Ind. Laws 1929, c. 2o7.
1238 Fed. (2d) 652 (S. D. Ind. 193o).
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legislation, but to sustain the classification adopted by the legislature if there
were substantial differences between the occupations separately classified.
He said:
"In view of the numerous distinctions above pointed out between
the business of a chain store and other types of store, we cannot pionounce the classification made by the statute to be arbitrary and unreasonable. That there are differences and advantages in favor of the
chain store is shown by the number of such chains established and by
their astonishing growth. More and more persons, like the appellee,
have found advantages in this method of merchandising and have therefore adopted it ...
"The court below fell into the error of assuming that the distinction between the appellee's business and that of the other sorts of
stores mentioned was solely one of ownership. It disregarded the differences shown by the record. They consist not merely in ownership,
but in organization, management, and type of business transacted. The
statute treats upon a similar basis all owners of chain stores similarly
situated. In the light of what we have said, this is all that the Constitution requires." 13

The minority judges contended that the advantages attributed to the
chain store lie not in the fact that it is one of a number of stores under the
same management, supervision or ownership, but in the fact that it is one
of the parts of a large business. Said Mr. Justice Sutherland (in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler) :
". .. the advantages relied upon arise from the aggregate size of
the entire business, and not from the number of parts into which it is
divided. For the want of a valid ground upon which to stand, therefore,
the classification should fall, because it is made to depend, not upon
size or value or character, amount of capital invested or income received,
but upon the mere circumstance--wholly irrelevant so far as any of
the advantages claimed are concerned-that the business of one is
carried on under many roofs, and that of the other under one only.
Reduced to this single detail of difference, what fairly conceivable
reason is there in the policies or objects of taxation which gives countenance to the requirement that the former shall make an annual contribution to the revenues of the state eighteen hundred times as much
as the latter? A classification comparable in principle would be to make
the amount of an income tax depend upon the number of sources from
which the income is derived, without regard to the character of the
sources or the amount of the income itself.
"Since the supposed differences thus are reduced to the one of
number only, and. since that turns out to be irrelevant and wholly
without substance, it follows that the act is a 'clear and hostile discrimination' against a selected body of taxpayers,
"Supra note io, at 541-42, 51 Sup. Ct. at 544-45.

.

.

.

a mere subter-
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fuge by which the members of one group of taxpayers are unequally
burdened for the benefit of the members of other groups similarly
circumstanced." 14
The dissenting judges placed specific reliance upon Quaker City Cab Co.
v. Pennsylvania,'5 in which was held invalid a Pennsylvania statute which
imposed a tax upon the gross receipts of corporations engaged in the general
taxicab business, but not upon like receipts of individuals and partnerships
engaged in the same business.
"The differences relied upon as justifying the tax [Mr. Justice
Sutherland declared] are fairly comparable with those relied upon in
the present case. It was said that there were advantages peculiar to
the corporate organization not enjoyed by individuals or partnerships,
such as those pointed out in Flintv. Stone Tracy Co ...
"These advantages, although brought sharply to the attention of
the court, were not considered as constituting differences having a
reasonable relation to the object of the Taxing Act, and the -tax was
held unconstitutional as denying to the corporation the equal protection
of the laws. It is hard to see how that conclusion can be reconciled, in
principle, with the present decision." 16
Mr. Justice Roberts did not undertake to reconcile the decision in
the instant case with that in the Quaker City Cab Co. case. He did not even
refer to that decision. The plain fact of the matter is, of course, that the
legislation held constitutional in the instant case would in all probability
never have been validated had the Court been constituted as it was in 1928,
when the Quaker City Cab Co. case was decided. The decision of the Court
in that case was written by Mr. Justice Butler, who joined the ranks of the
dissenting justices in the instant case. Justices Brandeis, Holmes and Stone,
who wrote dissenting opinions in 1928, joined Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
and Mr. Justice Roberts in forming a majority of the Court in 1931. The
problems presented for solution in the two cases were certainly analogous.
The dissenting opinions in the former case were based upon virtually the
same reasoning as that made use of in the majority opinion in the instant
case. It is patent that, in dealing with the question of the constitutionality
of an important type of state legislation, there has been a change in policy
on the part of the Court due to a change in its personnel.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it need
hardly be said, lays down no rule of thumb by which the validity of a particular statute may be determined. It is true that in interpreting the clause
the Supreme Court has declared in numerous cases that it does not prevent
" Supra note io, at 548, 51 Sup. Ct. at 547.

2277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553 (1928). It is of interest that Mr. Justice Roberts had
argued the case for the cab company in the Supreme Court.
"6Supra note IO,at 549-50, .51 Sup. Ct. at 547-48.

SUPREME COURT AND STATE ACTION UNDER z4th AMENDMENT

489

a state legislature from distinguishing, selecting and classifying the objects
of legislation, or from arranging persons, classes, property, trades or professions in different categories, with reference to the imposition of burdens
or taxes upon them or the regulation of their business, 17 provided the laws
bear equally and alike upon all those within the same class,' and that the
system of classification is not arbitrary or capricious, but rests upon some
reasonable or substantial ground of distinction, growing out of public policy
or prevalent economic or social conditions or the diverse natures of the trades
or businesses affected, and having some real relation to the object sought to
be accomplished.' 9
But what circumstances will justify the Court in concluding that a
given classification is either "reasonable" or "arbitrary"? Indubitably*there
is no magic formula to be applied in the solution of the problems which will
guarantee the perfection of the answers. The results reached in particular
cases are at bottom the products of. judicial discretion. Because of the nature
of the subject-matter ordinarily involved, the social, political and economic
predilections of the individual judges profoundly influence these results. In
the great majority of cases in which state action is contested under the equal
protection clause, moreover, there is involved, to borrow the words of Mr.
Justice Holmes, merely "the usual question of degree and of drawing a line
where no important distinction can be seen between the nearest points on the
two sides, but where the distinction between the extremes is plain." 20
In the instant Indiana case the majority judges did not experience any
difficulty in finding precedents to fortify their view of the legislation in
question. Brief reference to some of these should not be without interest.
In American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana21 a license tax imposed upon
persons and corporations carrying on the business of refining sugar and
molasses, which excepted planters and farmers grinding and refining their
' Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1922); City and County
of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123, 33 Sup. Ct. 657 (1913); Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank 170 U. S.283, IS Sup. Ct. 594 (1898) ; Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S.232, 10 Sup. Ct. 533 (80) ; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S.
114, 30 Sup. Ct. 496 (191o) ; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 3o Sup. Ct. 578
(1910).
'Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Mackey, 127 U. S.205, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161 (1888).
"Radice v. New York, 264 U. S.292, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924) ; Magoun v. Illinois Trust
& Say. Bank, 170 U. S.283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594 (1898) ; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43 (19oo) ; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis
Co., 240 U. S.342,
36 Sup. Ct. 370 (i916) ; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S.59, 32' Sup. Ct. 192 (1912) ;
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 Uj S. 563, 30 Sup. Ct. 578 (1910).
In the case last
cited it was said at 573, 30 Sup. Ct. at 580: "A very wide discretion must be conceded to the
legislative power of the state in the classification of trades, callings, businesses, or occupations which may be subjected to special forms of regulation or taxation through an excise or
license tax. If the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests
upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal
protection of the law."
. Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors of Jefferson County, Kentucky, 282 U. S. 19, 23,
51 Sup. Ct. 15 (1930).
"Supra note 19.
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own sugar and molasses, was held not to constitute an unconstitutional discrimination. In Quong Wing v. Kirkendall22 a statute of Montana imposing
a license fee on hand laundries was held not to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws because it did not apply to steam laundries, and because it
exempted from its operation laundries not employing more than two women.
In Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago 23 an ordinance classified theatres for
license fees based on and graded according to the admission charged. It
was shown that some of the theatres charging a higher admission had less
revenue than those charging smaller price and therefore paying lower license
fees. The classification was held valid. In W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota 24 a state statute requiring the proprietors of warehouses situated on
the right of way of a iailroad to secure a license from a state commission,
and containing no such requirement with respect to warehouses not so situated but doing precisely the same business, was held constitutional. In
Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy 25 a North .Carolina statute imposed an occupation tax upon every meat packing house doing business in that state. The
appellant company had its packing house in Kansas City and shipped its
products to various depots in the state, where they were sold in competition
with wholesalers and commission merchants who were not required, as was
the Armour Company, to pay the tax. The statute was sustained. In
Bradley v. Richmond 26 an ordinance imposed a tax on the conduct of certain
businesses and gave a power of classification to a committee of the city
council. That committee classified private bankers, placing a tax of one
amount on certain of them and of a different amount on others. The business
of those in the one class was that of lending money at high rates upon salaries and household furniture, while that done by the other class was that
of lending money upon commercial securities. The classification was held
not to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The decision in the instant case is a welcome one to those who endorse
Mr. Justice Holmes' well-known judicial approach to cases coming before
the Court in which governmental action is challenged under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments. 27 Viewed from the standpoint of social policy,
there seems to be no valid reason why state lawmakers should not be given
wide latitude in experimenting with taxation devices designed to curb the
I Supra note 19.

U. S. 6I, 33 Sup. Ct. 441 (1913).
S. 452, 21 Sup. Ct. 423 (901).
2oo U. S. 226, 26 Sup. Ct. 232 (i9o6).
U.
S. 477, 33 Sup. Ct. 318 (1913).
227

3228

i8o U.

i

'See

THE DIssENTING OPINIONS OF MR. JUsTicE HOLMES (1930); FRANK, LAW AND

253 et seq.; Dobyns, Justice Hohnes and the Fourteenth Amendinent (1918) 13 ILL. L. REv. 71; Frankfurter, The ConstitutionalOpinions of Justice Holmes
THE: MODERN MIND (1930)

(1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 683; Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holinesi Constitutionwl Opt1onts (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. gg; Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution (1927) 41 HARV.
L. REv. 121.
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growth of chain stores. If, in an effort to favor the small storekeeper and
the local banker, they see fit to subject this form of business enterprise
to a discriminatory taxing policy, it seems little short of grotesque for nine
(or to speak more literally, five) men in the national capital to undertake

to nullify their action by judicial fiat, no matter how vicious or absurd such
action may be considered to be. Certainly the chain store with its centralized
management, large capital resources, advertising advantages, quantity buying,
and superior facilities for mass distribution, may very well be considered
a sufficiently distinct form of economic organization to justify special govIf legislation of this type is economically unsound,
ernmental regulation.28
its unwisdom will in time be demonstrated. Remedial measures can then
be adopted and a policy put into effect that will meet the tested needs of
experience.
During the 1929-30 term of the Court the question of the constitution-

ality of state inheritance tax legislation had assumed unusual importance, due
in part to the fact that the Supreme Court reversed one of its own previous
decisions and greatly expanded the scope of the due process clause. Prior
to this time it had been the general position of the Court that incidental hardship resulting from the operation of state taxation laws did not in itself
render such legislation invalid, and that there was nothing in the Federal
Constitution to afford protection against double taxation by a state. 2 9
It was in Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota 30 that the Court
reversed itself. In that case a resident of New York died, owning bonds
of the state of Minnesota, of the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, and
certain state certificates of indebtedness, all worth more than $300,000.

'See, for example,

ZIMMERMAN, THE CHALLENGE OF CHAIN STORE DISTRIBUTION

(193I); I NYSTROM, ECONOMICS OF RETAILING (1930) 224-37; BAXTER, CHAIN STORE DisTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT (1928); HAYWARD AND WHITE, CHAIN STORES (1928); Tay-

lor, Prices in Clins and Independent Grocery Stores "in DUrta, N. C. (1930) 8 HAmv.
Bus. REV. 413; Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth Antmednent (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. II. See also for valuable discussions the four notes cited
supra note 9.
'In Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 524, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 477 (1886) the Court said: "If the
owner of personal property within a State resides in another State which taxes him for that
property as part of his general estate attached to his person, this action of the latter State
does not in the least affect the right of the State in which the property is situated to tax it
also. It is hardly necessary to cite authorities on a point so elementary." In Baker v.
Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137, 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 40, 41 (1923), Mr. Justice Brandeis, in holding
that the due process clause did not preclude a state from taxing the intangible property of a
railroad, or from ascertaining its value by deducting the value of the tangible property from
that of the entire property of the road, after giving the railroad company an opportunity to
be heard and submit evidence as to the value, said: "The contention that the statute violates
theL Fourteenth Amendment is wholly without merit. It has long been settled that the due
process clause does not preclude a State from taxing the intangible property of a railroad,
or from ascertaining its value substantially in the manner prescribed by the statute herein
assailed; that the equal protection clause is not violated by prescribing different rules of taxation for railroad companies than for concerns engaged in other lines of business; and that the
Federal Constitution does not afford protection against double taxation by a State, which is
here alleged."
Zo280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (I93O), noted in (193o) 29 MIcH. L. REV. 93; (1930)
40 YALE L. J. 99. For a discussion of the problem involved see also (930) 30 COL. L. REv.
404, 107I, and (1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. REV. 428.
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The bonds had been kept within the state of New York. None had any connection with business carried on by or for the decedent in Minnesota. That
state, however, assessed an inheritance tax upon the transfer of these bonds.
The state supreme court approved this action and upheld the tax, 1 and the
executor appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground
that Minnesota had no jurisdiction to tax the transfers at the death of
the non-resident and that the inheritance tax law was in contravention of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Minnesota contended that
since the debts represented by the bonds were given validity and protection
by her law, the situs for taxation purposes was in that state. This was in
substance the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Blackstone v. Miller.3 2
In other words, up to this time it had been the view of the Court that choses
in action were subject to taxation both at the debtor's domicile and at the
domicile of the creditor, and that two states might tax on different principles
the same testamentary transfer of property.
In the FarmersLoan and Trust Co. case, however, the Court held the
tax invalid on the ground that the bonds had never come within the territorial jurisdiction of the state of Minnesota, after the non-resident decedent
had acquired them. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice
McReynolds said:
"A very large part of the country's wealth is invested in negotiable
securities whose protection against discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxation, is matter of the greatest moment...
"Taxation is an intensely practical matter and laws in respect of it
should be construed and applied with a view of avoiding, so far as
possible, unjust and oppressive consequences. We have determined that
in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile of their
owner and we can find no sufficient reason for saying that they are
not entitled to enjoy an immunity against taxation at more than one
place similar to that accorded to tangibles." 33
Blackstone v. Miller was thrown into the judicial discard. Mr. Justice
McReynolds declared that it "no longer can be regarded as a correct exposition of existing law; and to prevent misunderstanding it is definitely overruled." '4 The Court took the position, in other words, that, due to changed
social and economic conditions, the due process clause should be interpreted
as guaranteeing protection against double taxation. Mr. Justice Holmes,
who had written the decision in Blackstone v. Miller, protested (together
with Mr. Justice Brandeis) against this change of attitude in a vigorous
dissenting opinion. He clung to the earlier position of the Court that the
lin re Estate of Taylor, 176 Minn. 634, 222 N. W. 528 (1928).
188 U. S. 189,23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).
Supra note 30, at 212, 50 Sup. Ct. at IOO.
Supra note 30, at 209, 5o Sup. Ct. at 99.
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bonds should be held taxable by Minnesota in spite of the fact that they
were also taxable at the domicile of the owner, because the debt or obligation
represented by the bonds existed by virtue of, and under the protection of,
the laws of Minnesota. He said:
"It seems to me that the law of Minnesota is a present force necessary to the existence of the obligation, and that therefore, however
contrary it may be to enlightened policy, the tax is good ...
"A good deal has to be read into the Fourteenth Amendment to
give it any bearing upon this case. The Amendment does not condemn
everything that we may think undesirable on economic or social
grounds." 35
In Baldwin v. Missouri3 6 decided at the same term of court, a resident
of Illinois died, leaving all her property to her son, also a resident of Illinois.
At her death she owned certain intangible property in the form of bank accounts, coupon bonds issued by the United States, and sundry promissory
notes, most of which were executed by citizens of Missouri. The evidences of
all this property were discovered in the state of Missouri. The supreme court
of Missouri had held that the state could impose an inheritance tax on this
property, since the evidences thereof were found in the state.37 Or to put the
matter in another way, it was held that the situs of the property, for purposes
of taxation, was within the state. The Supreme Court, however, relying on
its decision in the FarmersLoan and Trust Co. case, held the Missouri taxing
law 38 unconstitutional. Said Mr. Justice McReynolds:
"The bonds and notes, although physically within Missouri, under
our former opinions were choses in action with situs at the domicile
of the creditor. At that point they too passed from the dead to the living
and there this transfer was actually taxed. As they were not within
Missouri for taxation purposes the transfer was not subject to her
power." 39

Mr. Justice Holmes again dissented, contending that since the bonds,
notes and bank accounts were within the power and received the protection
of Missouri, the tax was justifiable. That state was entitled to demand a
quid pro quo. He suggested that several other cases 40 "now join Blackstone
' Supra note 30, at 216-18, 5o Sup. Ct. at 102-3.

Z3281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930), noted in (1930) 44 HAv. L. REv. 132; (1930)
oF PA. L. REv. 99; (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 99; (1930) 29 MIcH. L. Rw. 93; (0931) 4
SO. CALIF. L. REv. 326. See also Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1075; Lowndes, Bases of Jurisdiction in State Taxation of
Inheritanwes and Property (1931) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 850; Mason, Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Imposing Inheritance Taxes (1931) 29 MIcEr. L. REV. 324.
37323 Mo. 207, 19 S. W. (2d) 732 (1929).
Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) § 558.
Supra note 36, at 593, 50 Sup. Ct. at 438.
"'Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors for the Parish of Orleans,
221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550 (igi) ; Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 6o7

79 U.

(1914).
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v. Miller on the Index Expurgatorious-butwe need an authoritative list."
He declared:
"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that
I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment
in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the
States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky
to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority
of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the
Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. .

.

.

Of course the words

'due process of law' if taken in their literal meaning have no application
to this case; and while it is too late to deny that they have been given
a much more extended and artificial signification, still we ought to
remember the great caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the
power of the States, and should be slow to construe the clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide but
the Court's own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the States
may pass."

41

Mr. Justice Stone, who had concurred in the result reached in the
Minnesota case on the ground that there it was not necessary to invoke the
power of the state to effect a transfer of the property, now joined Justices
Holmes and Brandeis. He pointed out that Missouri laws alone protected the
physical notes and bonds and the securities located there. He saw no reason
why the state in which the evidences of indebtedness were found should be
deprived of taxing power merely because the taxpayer had subjected himself
to the same power of another state. He intimated that the Court's opinion
would open the door to fraud and evasion. He said:
"Under the law as it has been, no one need subject himself to
double taxation by keeping his securities in a state different from his
domicil, or by seeking the protection of its laws for his mortgage investments. But it is a practical consideration of some moment that taxation
becomes increasingly difficult if the securities of a non-resident may not
be taxed where located, and where alone they may be reached, but where
the courts are not open to the tax gatherers of the domicil." 42
We are now in a position to refer to Beidler v. South CarolinaTax Commission,43 decided during the 1930 term, in which the Court was called upon
to determine the legality of South Carolina's action in imposing an inheritance
tax on indebtedness in the form of advances and dividends due from a South
Carolina corporation to a non-resident stockholder. The South Carolina
tax commission had levied a tax on the transfer of such indebtedness, over36, at 595, 50 Sup. Ct. at 439.
SSupra note 36, at 598, 50 Sup. Ct. at 44o.
'3282 U. S. 1, .5 Sup. Ct. 54 (93o), noted in (93)
MIcH. L. REv. 389.
' Supra note

31 COL. L. REv. 174; (1931)

29
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ruling the claim of the executors of the non-resident stockholder's estate
that the state had no jurisdiction to impose such a tax, and that its levy
constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law. The
supreme court of South Carolina sustained the action of the tax commission
and the executors appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. In
holding the tax unconstitutional, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"In reaching its conclusion as to the validity of the tax, the state
court relied chiefly upon the decision of this Court in Blackstone v.
Miller.

.

.

.

That decision has been overruled, and it is now estab-

lished that the mere fact that the debtor is domiciled within the state
does not give it jurisdiction to impose an inheritance or succession tax
upon the transfer of the debt by a decedent who is domiciled in another
state. .

.

. Open accounts, including credits for cash deposited in bank,

fall within this principle, and its application is not defeated by the mere
presence of bonds or notes, or other evidences of debt, within a state
other than that of the domicile of the owner." 4
In this case Mr. Justice Holmes merely observed that the decisions of the
last term cited by the Chief Justice seemed to sustain the conclusions reached
by him. "Therefore", he continued, "Mr. Justice Brandeis and I acquiesce,
without repeating reasoning that did not prevail with the Court." 4'
An important decision involving the alleged retroactive application of
the Massachusetts inheritance tax law was Coolidge v. Long.46 The contested legislation, which took effect on January i, i92I, provided that all

property within the jurisdiction of the state which should pass to any
person, absolutely or in trust, by deed, grant or gift, except in cases of a
bona fide purchase for full consideration in money or money's worth, made
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death, should be
subject to a tax. 47 The petitioners (appellants in this case) were trustees
under a deed and declaration of trust executed on July 29, 1907 by J. Randolph Coolidge, Julia Coolidge and the petitioners. By that deed a large
amount of real and personal estate was transferred to the trustees by the
settlors voluntarily and not as a bona fide purchase for full consideration
in money or in money's worth. The part of the trust fund furnished by
Mr. Coolidge was four-sevenths, and that furnished by Mrs. Coolidge was
three-sevenths. Mrs. Coolidge died in January, x92x, and Mr. Coolidge on
November io, 1925. By the terms of the trust the income was to be paid
"Suepra note 43, at 7-8, 51 Sup. Ct. at 55.

'Supra note 43, at io, 5I Sup. Ct. at 55.
'°282 U. S. .582, 51 Sup. Ct. 306 (ig3i), noted in (ig3i) i5 MINN. L. REv. 726; (i93i)
40 YALE L. J. 1331. For a
29 MIcH. L. REv. IO95; (931)
44 HAR. L. REV. iio3; (93)

discussion of the subject involved see also Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers hIteizded to
Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at Grantor's Death (I93O)
613, 623-25.
'MASS. GEN. LAWS (ig2I) c. 65.

14 MINN. L. REv. 453,
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in the above-mentioned proportions to each of the settlors during their joint
lives and then the entire income to the survivor. Upon the death of the
survivor, the principal was to be divided equally among five sons, provided
that, if any of the sons should predecease the survivor of the settlors, his
share should go to those entitled to take his intestate property under the
statute of distributions in force at the death of such survivor, with a further
provision to the effect that in no event should a widow of such deceased
son take as distributee more than half of such share.
When the declaration of trust involved in this case was executed, no
statute was in effect under which the succession to the trust property could
have been subjected to this tax. The statutes then in force provided for
the imposition of an excise only where the succession was to collateral relations and strangers. The defendant, commissioner of corporations and
taxation of the state, determined that the petitioners were subject to excise
taxes, under the law, upon the four-sevenths and the three-sevenths of the
trust estate furnished respectively by each settlor as of November 1o, 1925.
The probate court of Norfolk County, Massachusetts, reserved for the consideration of the supreme judicial court all questions of law and the matter
of what decrees should be entered. That court held the statute constitutional and sustained the taxes. 48 The petitioners appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, challenging the statute on the ground of its
alleged repugnance to the contract clause of the Federal Constitution and
to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
thereto.
The Court, in a five to four decision, invalidated the statute. Mr. Justice Butler', in delivering its opinion, stressed the point that no act of Congress had been held by the Court to impose a tax upon possession and
enjoyment, the right to which had fully vested prior to the enactment. Here
the succession was complete when the trust deeds of Mr. and Mrs. Coolidge
took effect. Since it had been decided in numerous cases that a transfer
tax is imposed not upon property but upon the right of succession, it followed that where there was a complete vesting of the right to possession
and enjoyment before the enactment of the transfer tax statute, it could not
be reached by that form of taxation. The statute, therefore, was repugnant
both to the contract clause and to the due process clause. The following
extract from the New York case of Re Craig49 was quoted with approval:
"The underlying principle which supports the tax is that such right
[the right of succession] is not a natural one but is in fact a privilege
only, and that the authority conferring the privilege may impose conditions upon its exercise. But when the privilege has ripened into a right
268 Mass. 443, 167 N. E. 757 (1929).
"997 App. Div. 289, 89 N. Y. Supp. 971 (19o4), aff'd, 181 N. Y. 551, 74 N. E.

4s
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character in question, and
executed grant or contract
is protected from legislative
50

Mr. Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Stone. He said in part:
"The application of the statute . . . is held by this Court to be a
denial of due process, and an impairment of the obligation of a contract,
on the sole ground that the remainder vested before the adoption of
the taxing statute, although the enjoyment in possession of the property,
and the termination of the possibility of the contingent gift over, both
followed its enactment.
"This is to deny to the commonwealth the power to distinguish, in
laying its tax, between the vesting of a defeasible future interest which
carries to the beneficiary no assurance of future possession or enjoyment and the later vesting of that interest by death in possession and
enjoyment of the tangible property, without possibility of being divested.
It is to assert that the succession is so complete upon the mere creation
of the future interest that the state must tax the future estate when that
interest comes into being, or thereafter abstain entirely from taxing it.
"This position seems to me untenable. It is founded on the premise
that the only privilege enjoyed by the holder of a future interest in
property is the dry legal abstraction of owning that particular interestthat, if it vested years ago, to tax the owner later on the occasion of his
coming into actual possession, control, and enjoyment of the property
is in fact to tax him presently for the exercise of a privilege long since
enjoyed." 51
There has been no uniformity in the decisions of state courts where
problems were presented similar to that in the instant case. As indicated
above, the New York court antedated the Supreme Court in invoking the
contract clause. And in Hunt v. Wicht 2 it was said that taxation of this
character amounted to a taking of private property for public use without
compensation. These state courts and the majority opinion in Coolidge v.
Long take the view that technically a future interest has vested in the remaindermen by inter vivos grant. The dissenting opinion, however, argues that
to decide the case on this ground is to give too much weight to a mere
technicality. It was hard for Mr. Justice Roberts to understand, moreover,
why a tax laid upon the succession after the future interest has been created
and the right accrued, but before the actual enjoyment in possession of the
" Ibid. 296,

89 N. Y. Supp. at 975.

.Supra note 46, at 607-8, 51 Sup. Ct. at 313.
174 Cal. 205, 162 Pac. 639 (1917). But cf. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bugbee, 6
N. J. Misc. 415, 141 Atl. 579 (1928). The importance of the question involved is shown by

the fact that forty-one states and territories have statutes containing provisions substantially
similar to those of the Massachusetts acts involved in the instant case. The complete list is
furnished in a footnote to the dissenting opinion. Slepra note 46, at 607, 51 Sup. Ct. at 313.
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property, is any more a denial of due process of law than a tax laid upon
income accrued prior to the enactment of the taxing law but received after
its passage. The validity of the latter form of tax, he pointed out, is now
beyond question.
The remaining cases involving the constitutionality of state taxation
laws gave the Court little difficulty and may be disposed of without extended
comment.
In Columbus and Greenville Railway Company v. Miller " a Mississippi law imposing a levee tax of $350 a mile on the main line of standard
gauge railroads within a levee district, but providing by an amending Act of
1926 " that the tax per mile of any railroad company which did not own
in excess of twenty-five miles of railroad within the district should be $50,
was held not to be a violation of due process of law or of the equal protection
of the laws. The railway company here fell within the classification provided
for by the amendment, as its main line in the district was only 18.41 miles
in length. It had paid the tax at the rate of $5o a mile, but the state tax collector sued to collect a tax at the higher rate. The supreme court of the state
had held the classification put into effect by the Act of 1926 to be arbitrary
and unreasonable, and therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 5
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes pointed out first that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against state action is only for the benefit of those who
are injured through the invasion of personal or property rights or through
some form of discrimination which the Amendment forbids. The constitutional guaranty, he said, did not extend to the mere interest of an official,
who had been deprived of no property at all. Answering the contention that
the Act of 1926 was invalid upon its face, he said:
"But the mere selection by the state Legislature, in the exercise of
its broad discretion in the imposition of taxes, of a mileage basis, and
the establishment of a particular class of railroads having less than
twenty-five miles of main line within the District, cannot be regarded,
in the absence of any further showing, as arbitrary and as constituting
a violation of the Federal Constitution. On the contrary, a classification
of this sort has frequently been sustained." 5"
In Memphis and Charleston Railway Company v. Pace 57 the Court
was asked to hold unconstitutional as a denial of the due process and equal
protection clauses, several statutes passed by Mississippi permitting the
creation of a road district and the imposition of an ad valorem tax on all
taxable property, real and personal, within the district.5" The appellant
3283

U. S. 96, 51 Sup. Ct. 392 (1931).

Miss. Laws 1926, C. 259.

127 So. 784 (Miss. 1930).
Supra note 53, at 101, 51 Sup. Ct. at 394.
U. S. 241, 51 Sup. Ct. io8 (I93I).
'Miss. Laws 1920, c. 277; ibid. 1926, c. 278; Miss. Priv. & Loc. Laws 1926, c. io8o.
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contended that the tax was objectionable since it was not apportioned according to benefits, that its property in fact received no benefits from the improvement, but that even conceding that it did receive some benefit, the tax laid
thereon was disproportionate to the benefit and to the tax laid on other property. The supreme court of the state had sustained the laws.59 Citing
previous decisions in taxation cases where similar issues were presented, the
Supreme Court upheld the levy. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking for a
unanimous Court, said:
"Where the tax is laid generally on all property or all real property
within the taxing unit, it does not become arbitrary or discriminatory
merely because it is spread over such property on an ad valorem basis;
nor where the tax is thus general and ad valorem does its validity depend
upon the receipt of some special benefit as distinguished from the general
benefit to the community." 60
In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina61 several statutes of North
Carolina 62 were invalidated which imposed upon a corporation a tax based
upon such proportion of its entire income as the value of its realty and tangible personalty within the state bore to the value of its entire realty and
tangible personalty, and which was so applied in the instant case as to tax
from 66 per cent. to 85 per cent. of the entire income of the corporation, on
the ground that, as thus applied, it was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The evidence showed that the appellant corporation, which
was engaged in the business of tanning, manufacturing, and selling belting
and other heavy leathers, was incorporated in New York and maintained
a manufacturing plant in Asheville, North Carolina. The business was
conducted upon both wholesale and retail plans. The corporation claimed
that the profit from its wholesale business was partly attributable to manufacturing in North Carolina and partly to selling in New York, but that
the accountants for the commissioner of revenue made no attempt to separate
this, and that the entire wholesale profit was credited to manufacturing and
allocated to North Carolina. It was said that no attempt was made to separate profits derived from manufacturing in New York from profits from
manufacturing in Asheville, and that all manufacturing profits were allocated
to North Carolina. It was also claimed that, in the retail part of the business,
certain operations essential to the retail merchandising business were conducted from the New York office. The so-called "buying profit" was alleged
to result from the skill with which hides were bought, and it was contended
that these buying operations were not conducted in North Carolina. The
"Memphis

& C. R. R. v. Bullen, 154 Miss. 536, 121 So. 826

0 Supra note 57,
CM283 U. S. 123,

(1929).

at 246. 51 Sup. Ct. at 11o.
51 Sup. Ct. 385 (1931). See comment in (1931) 40 YALE L. J.
1 N. C. Laws 1923, c. 4, § 201; ibid. 1925, c. Ioi, § 2O1; ibid. 1927, c. 80, § 311.
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evidence also tended to show that for the years 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926,
the average income having its source in the manufacturing and tanning
operations within North Carolina was 17 per cent. The appellant's prayer
for revision of taxes had been disallowed by the state commissioner of revenue, and the judgment of the superior court dismissing the taxpayer's action
had been affirmed by the supreme court of North Carolina. 3 Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes stated the Court's position as follows:
"For the present purpose, in determining the validity of the statutory method as applied to the appellant, it is not necessary to review
the evidence in detail, or to determine as a matter of fact the precise part
of the income which should be regarded as attributable to the business
conducted in North Carolina. It is sufficient to say that, in any aspect
of the evidence, and upon the assumption made by the state court with
respect to the facts shown, the statutory method, as applied to the appellant's business for the years in question operated unreasonably and
arbitrarily, in attributing to North Carolina a percentage of income out
of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant
in that state. In this view, the taxes as laid were beyond the state's
authority." 64

In Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors of Jefferson County, Kentucky, 5
the Supreme Court held valid a Kentucky statute 66 which provided that the
individual shareholders of a corporation, at least 75 per cent. of whose
total property was taxable in Kentucky, should not be required to list their
shares for taxation so long as the corporation paid taxes on all of its property in Kentucky. Holders of stock in corporations generally were required
to list their shares for taxation. To the contention that this discrimination
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws, Mr. Justice Holmes replied
as follows:
"Thus we come to the usual question of degree and of drawing
a line where no important distinction can be seen between the nearest
points on the two sides, but where the distinction between the extremes
is plain ...
"We agree with the Court of Appeals that there could have been no
question if the statute had said ninety per cent and that fixing seventyfive was equally plainly 'a reasonable effort to do justice to all in
view of the way all our other assessments are made'.
". .. The principle of justice that leads to the exemption that has
been dealt with could not be insisted upon as a matter of constitutional
right and it is reasonable for the legislature to confine it to well marked
cases, rather than to press it to a logical extreme." 67
199 N. C. 42, 153 S. E. 85o (1930).
' Supra note 61, at 135, 51 Sup. Ct. at 389.
C282 U. S. 19, 51 Sup. Ct. 15 (1930).
' Ky. Acts 1930, § 4088. The court of appeals of Kentucky had affirmed the validity of
0OO9
(1929).
the legislation. See 23o Ky. 182, 18 S. W. (2d)
Ir Supra note 65, at 23-24, 5, Sup. Ct. at 15-16.
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In Storaasli v. Minnesota Il the appellant, a member of the military
forces of the United States quartered upon the Fort Snelling reservation,
challenged the validity of Minnesota legislation 69 providing for the imposition of a motor vehicle registration tax upon the ground, inter alia, that it
discriminated against him in favor of residents, because it exempted vehicles
licensed under it from payment of property taxes. The Court, however,
declared the exemption to be a lawful one, saying that the appellant was not
discriminated against merely because of the fact that he was not in a position
to claim the exemption. "Doubtless in the case of every taxing act which
creates exemptions", said Mr. Justice Roberts, "there are those who cannot
bring themselves within the exempt class, but this does not deprive them
of the equal protection of the law." To
A tax imposed by the California constitution 71 on the gross receipts
of companies owning, operating or managing any automobile, truck or autotruck, jitney bus, stage or autostage, used in the business of transportation
of persons or property, as common carriers for compensation over any public
highway within the state, was held valid by a unanimous vote in AIward v.
Johnson.72

It was provided that funds arising from the levy were to be

assigned to maintain the roads essential to the operation of the companies.
The word "companies" included persons, partnerships, joint stock associations, companies and corporations. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
McReynolds said that the petitioner was in no position to complain of an
arbitrary enactment. There was a plain distinction between property employed in conducting a business which required constant use of the highways
and property not so employed. The mere fact that he was required to pay
a higher rate upon property devoted to his peculiar business than was demanded of property not so employed was considered unimportant.
State Action in Aid of the Police Power
Among the forms of state action passed upon by the Court, of either a
legislative or administrative character, which are included under this broad
and indefinite grouping are measures tending to restrict freedom of speech
or of the press, regulate banking, trade and commerce, regulate forms and
modes of judicial procedure, conserve wild game and natural resources,
promote the public safety, health, morals and welfare, or to remedy some
particular evil. In none of the cases here dealt with, however, can the state
action complained of be catalogued as pertaining to "morals" or "health".
S283 U. S. 57, 51 Sup. Ct. 354 (1931).
' MinN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 2672-2704, as amended by Minn. Laws 1929, c. 335.
The supreme court of the state had sustained the legislation, i8o Minn. 241, 23o N. W. 572
(1930).

7oSupra note 68, at 62, 51 Sup. Ct. at 355.
"'Art. 13, § 15. The state supreme court had sustained the tax. See 208 Cal. 359, 281
Pac. 389 (1929).
V-282 U. S. 509, 51 Sup. Ct. 273 (1931), noted in (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rrv. 8g9.
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In Near v. Minnesota 73 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional as a
denial of liberty of the press and of speech a statute of Minnesota 74-the
so-called "Gag Law"-which provided for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or
other periodical". The statute authorized the suppression of such publications by injunction, unless the publisher could prove that "the truth was
published for good motives and for justifiable ends", and made further publication punishable as a contempt. The court was empowered, as in other cases
of contempt, to punish disobedience to a temporary or permanent injunction
by a fine of not more than $I,ooo or by imprisonment in the county jail for
not more than twelve months. In announcing the Court's opinion, Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes declared that "it is no longer open to doubt that the liberty
of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.
It was found impossible to conclude that this essential personal liberty of the
citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental rights
of person and property". "5 The statute under consideration, he pointed out,
operated not only to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical but to
put the publisher under an effective censorship. He continued:
"If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and
effect of the statute in substance is that public authorities may bring
the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before a judge upon
a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter-in particular that the matter consists of charges against
public officers of official dereliction-and, unless the owner or publisher
is able and disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge
that the charges are true and are published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further
publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is the essence of
censorship.
U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (931), noted in (93)
80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 13o.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 10,123-1 to lO,123-3. The supreme court of Minnesota had sustained the validity of the statute. See 179 Minn. 40, 228 N. W. 326 (1q29).
' Supra note 73, at 707, 5I Sup. Ct. at 628. The following cases were cited by the Chief
Justice in support of this statement: Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 6 52, 45 Sup. Ct. 625
(1925) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. .55 (1927) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 5r Sup. Ct. 532
(1931). The Supreme Court has been hesitant in arriving at this result. In Patterson v.
Colorado, 2o5 U. S.454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (I9o7), and in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325,
41 Sup. Ct. 125 (92o), it expressly declined to decide whether the Constitution of the
United States imposed any limitation on a State in restricting speech. In Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 543, 42 Sup. Ct. 516, 522 (1922) the Court said by way of dicta,
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the
United States imposes upon the states any restrictions about ',freedom of speech.' . . ." In
the Gitlow case, supra, however, the Court said (at 666, 45 Sup, Ct. at 63o) : "For present
purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental
personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states. We do not regard the incidental statement in Prudential
,283
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such a statute, authorizing suppression and injunction on
such a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissable
for the Legislature to provide that at any time the publisher of any
newspaper could be brought before a court, or even an administrative
officer (as the constitutional protection may not be regarded as resting
on mere procedural details), and required to produce proof of the truth
of his publication, or of what he intended to publish and of his motives,
or stand enjoined. If this can be done, the Legislature may provide
machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion
what are justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly. And it
would be but a step to a complete system of censorship." 76
Mr. Justice Butler wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland. In the
opinion of these justices the majority opinion gave to the concept of freedom
of the press a meaning and scope not theretofore recognized, and construed
"liberty" in the due process clause in such a manner as to "put upon the states
a federal restriction that is without precedent". In their view it was wholly
proper for the state to denounce as nuisances publications that threatened
morals, peace and good order, and to enjoin their further publication. They
pointed out that the statute did not authorize a previous restraint on publication, but only one in respect of continuing to do what had been duly
adjudged to constitute a nuisance. Said Mr. Justice Butler:
"It is well known, as found by the state Supreme Court, that existing libel laws are inadequate effectively to suppress evils resulting from
the kind of business and publications that are shown in this case. The
doctrine that measures such as the one before us are invalid because they
operate as previous restraints to infringe freedom of press exposes the
peace and good order of every community and the business and private
affairs of every individual to the constant and protracted false and
malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have purpose
and sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or
program for oppression, blackmail or extortion." 7
In Stromberg v. California11 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
(Justices McReynolds and Butler dissenting) as a denial of the right of free
speech and an impairment of liberty the first clause of a statute of California 71 which made it a felony to display in any public place a red flag,
banner or badge "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized
government or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an
Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions
on the states concerning freedom of speech, as determinative of this question." For a discussion of this subject see Note (193) 31 COL. L. REv. 468.
71 Supra note 73, at 713, 721, 51 Sup. Ct. at 63o, 633.
77 Supra note 73, at 737-38, 51 Sup. Ct. at 638-39.
.raSupranote 75, discussed in (1931) i GEo. L. REV. 469.
1 CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 463a.
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aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character." The appellant, a young
woman of nineteen, was one of the supervisors of a summer camp for children. She was a member of the Young Communist League, an international
organization affiliated with the Communist Party. The charge against her
concerned a daily ceremony at the camp in which she supervised and directed
the children in raising a red flag, "a camp-made reproduction of the flag of
Soviet Russia, which was also the flag of the Communist Party in the United
States." There was also a ritual at which the children stood at salute and
recited a pledge of allegiance "to the workers' red flag, and to the cause for
which it stands, one aim throughout our lives, freedom for the working
class." The appellant was convicted in a superior court of California and
the judgment was affirmed by the district court of appeal.8 0 Petition for a
hearing by the supreme court of California had been denied. The state court
had conceded that the constitutionality of the phrase "of opposition to organized government", contained in the first clause of the statute, was doubtful,
but based its decision on the ground that this phrase could be eliminated
from the section without materially changing its purposes. Disregarding
the first clause of the statute, and upholding the other clauses, the state court
sustained the conviction.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, was
unable to agree with this disposition of the case. The verdict against the
appellant, the Court pointed out, was a general one and did not specify the
ground upon which it rested. If any one of the clauses of the statute was
invalid, and it could not be determined upon the record that the appellant was
not convicted under that clause, the conviction could not be upheld. The
Court concluded from its study of the record that it was impossible to say
under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. In holding
unconstitutional the first clause of the Act, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of
our constitutional system. A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty
of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment." 81
The decisions in these two cases indicate an unmistakable liberal trend
upon the part of the Supreme Court in passing upon the constitutionality
of legislation designed to curb freedom of speech and of the press. It is
soio6 Cal. App. 725, 290 Pac. 93 (930).

I Supra note 75, at 369, 51 Sup. Ct. at 536.
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extremely doubtful, to say the least, if the statute under consideration in
Near v. Minnesota would have been invalidated'had the Supreme Court been
constituted as it was at the beginning of the 1929 term. In the Stromberg
case, however, it will be noted that Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland
joined the ranks of the majority, so that here it is probable that the statute
would have been repudiated even without the aid of the two newest members
of the Court. The liberality of the Court's view is indicated by its insistence,
in the extract from the Stromberg case above quoted, that the privilege of
free discussion, to the end that governmental changes may be secured by
lawful means, is essential to national security. And in the Near case it was
even said that adverse criticism of public officials is of great social utility. It
was pointed out that "the administration of government has become more
complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied,
crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection
by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the fundamental security
of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the
primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities." 82
In the Stromberg case, nevertheless, the Court reiterated the general
84
position taken by it in Gitlow v. New York 83 and Whitney v. California
that the right of free speech is not an absolute one, and that the state, in the
exercise of its police power, may punish the abuse of this freedom. On this
point Mr. Chief Justice. Hughes said:
"There is no question but that the State may thus provide for the
punishment of those who indulge in utterances which incite to violence
and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized government by
unlawful means. There is no constitutional immunity for such conduct
abhorrent to our institutions." 85
As matters now stand, therefore, it would seem that the political and economic
malcontent is guaranteed, in time of peace at any rate, a reasonably full
opportunity to voice radical doctrines, provided there is no employment of, or
incitation to, force, violence and crime.
Passing from the question of free speech to consideration of the
problems arising out of attempted state action relating to such matters as the
regulation of trade, commerce and banking, the regulation of forms and
modes of judicial procedure, the conservation of wild game and natural resources, and the promotion of the public safety, convenience and general welfare, we come upon a varied assortment of cases.
" Supra note 73, at 719, 5I Sup. Ct. at 632.
83nSpra note 75.
Ibid.
SSupra note 75, at 368-69, 51 Sup. Ct. at 535.
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In O'Gorman and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.5 6 the
Court refused to declare unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law a
statute of New Jersey 87 which provided that "in order that rates . . .shall
be reasonable", it should be unlawful for any fire insurance company licensed
in the state to allow commissions in excess of a reasonable amount to persons
acting as its agents, or to allow any commission to any person for acting as
its local agent, ir excess of that allowed to any one of its local agents on
such risks in the state. The New Jersey court of errors and appeals had
affirmed the judgment of the trial court sustaining the constitutionality of
the statute upon the ground that since commissions paid to local agents
naturally enter into the cost of such insurance to the public, it was within the
police power of the state to require that the commissions must be reasonable. s8 Since 20 per cent. was the amount of commissions paid to some
local agents, the effect of this legislation was to determine that a commission
in excess of that amount was unreasonable. After observing that "the
business of insurance is so far affected with a public interest that the State
may regulate the rates", Mr. Justice Brandeis, who announced the Court's
view, went on to say:
"The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the
ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable
and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute. It does not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any
facts of which the court must take judicial notice, that in New Jersey
evils did not exist in the business of fire insurance for which this statutory provision was an appropriate remedy. The action of the legislature
and of the highest court of the State indicates that such evils did exist.
The record is barren of any allegation of fact tending to show unreasonableness." "
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler dissented
on the ground that the law impaired the "liberty of contract" guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. In a "separate opinion" they declared:
"In order to justify the denial of the right to make private contracts, some special circumstances sufficient to indicate the necessity
therefor must be shown by the party relying upon the denial. Here the
8282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 13o (193I), noted in (1931) 17 VA. L. Rw. 490, (1931) 15
MINN. L. REV. 707, (193I) 31 CoL. L. REV. 498, (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 643, (93)
79 U.
OF PA. L. RV. 8o6, (ig3i) 4o YALE L. J. 657. See also the discussion cf this case in Powell,
State Utilities and the Supreme Court, I922-I93o (1931) 29 MICii. L. REv. 811, at 816, 838.
' N. J. Laws 1928, C. 128, p. 258.
105 N. 3. L. 642, 146 Atl. 370 (1929).

SSupra note 86, at 257-58, 51 Sup. Ct. at 132.
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right freely to agree upon reasonable compensation has been abridged;
and no special circumstances demanding such action have been disclosed.
Under the construction placed upon the statute no agent can make an
enforceable agreement with an insurance company definitely fixing his
compensation. Always the company can defeat his claim for the agreed
amount, reasonable in fact, by paying less to another agent." 90
The contrast between the O'Gorman and Near cases is significant. The
statutes in both cases were contested on the ground that they violated the
"liberty" guaranteed in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the O'Gornan case the "liberty" pertained to the right to contract. Mr.
Justice Brandeis, after laying down the fundamental premise that "the
business of insurance is so far affected with a public interest that the State
may regulate the rates", 9 ' and reminding us that "the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute", 92 reaches the conclusion that it "does
not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the
Court must take judicial notice" that the legislative provision was not an
"appropriate remedy" for the evils it was designed to eradicate. 93 In the
Near case the "liberty" was that relating to speech and the press. Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, after conceding that such liberty was not "an absolute right"
and that "the state may punish its abuse", 9 4 went on to observe that "the statute must be tested by its operation and effect"," and reached the conclusion
that the statutory presumption in favor of its constitutionality must be overthrown.
Every justice who voted to hold the statute involved in the Near case
invalid voted to sustain the constitutionality of the enactment in the O'Gorman case. The exponent of a realistic approach to the operation of the
judicial process would seem to have ample ground for the view that the
Court was influenced in drawing the lines where it drew them in the two
cases much more by considerations of political, social and economic policy
than by any recondite canons of constitutional interpretation. And the
skeptic may perhaps be pardoned for suggesting that in the O'Gorman case
Mr. Justice Brandeis utilized the illusory concept of "affectation with a
public interest" 96 merely as a convenient device for justifying in esoteric
' Supra note 86, at 269, 51 Sup. Ct. at 136.
Supra note 86, at 257, 51 Sup. Ct. at 13.
' Supra note 89.
'Supra note 86, at 258, 51 Sup. Ct. at 132.
°'Supranote 73, at 7o8, 51 Sup. Ct. at 628.
Ibid.
'Supra note 86, at 257, 51 Sup. Ct. at 13.
In his dissenting opinion in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 451, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 435 (1927) Mr. Justice Stone said: "The phrase
'business affected with a public interest' seems to me to be too vague and illusory to carry us
very far on the way to a solution. It tends in use to become only a convenient expression
91

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

legal theory a solution of a very practical problem in applied economics
which the Court, by a majority of one, thought it wise to adopt. Realists
who accept the Holmes theory of constitutional interpretation in due process
cases will no doubt welcome the results arrived at by the Court in the two
cases, even though they entertain mental reservations with respect to the
sanctity of the formula made use of by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the O'Gorman
case.
In Abie State Bank v. Bryan 97 the plaintiff bank had contested the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute Il authorizing the levy of certain
special assessments against state banks under the bank guaranty law of that
state, upon the ground that their collection constituted the taking of its property without due process of law. The state district court had entered a decree
in favor of the complainants sustaining their contention that the assessments
were unreasonable and confiscatory, and hence repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. The decree, which gave a permanent injunction, was reversed
by the Supreme Court of Nebraska; the injunction was dissolved and the
action dismissed."9 The plaintiff thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. In delivering the Court's opinion sustaining the statute, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes pointed out that while the provisions of the
original bank guaranty law providing for a fund to be raised by assessments
upon all the state banks was an important safeguard for all depositors, it was
nevertheless but a police regulation, the sanction of which lay in the constitutional power of the state and not in contract. The Court, moreover, considered of importance a subsequently enacted modifying statute 100 which
provided that only three of the special assessments remained effective; and
for the future there was a limitation of the obligation to a total annual assessment of two-tenths of one per cent. of average daily deposits instead of
assessments aggregating six-tenths, as were made possible by the previous
law. The future assessments, to this restricted amount, were limited to a
period of ten years. The Chief Justice said:
"The origin of rights under the Bank Guaranty Law was wholly
statutory-an act of grace by the Legislature, so far as depositors were
for describing those businesses, regulation of which has been permitted in the past. To say
that only those businesses affected with a public interest may be regulated is but another way
of stating that all those businesses which may be regulated are affected with a public interest.

It is difficult to use the phrase free of its connotation of legal consequences and hence when
used as a basis of judicial decision, to avoid begging the question to be decided. The very
,fact that it has been applied to businesses unknown to Lord Hale, who gave sanction to its
use, should caution us against the assumption that the category has now become complete or
fixed and that there may not be brought into it new classes of business ot transactions not
hitherto included, in consequence of newly devised methods of extortionate price exaction."
07282 U. S. 765, 51 Sup. Ct. 252 (93I), commented upon in (1931) 40 YAix L. J. I1O1.
' NE. ComP. STAT. (1922), § 8o28, as amended by Neb. Laws 1923, c. 191, § 26.
Iig Neb. 153, 227 N. W. 922 (1929).
Neb. Laws 193o, Ex. Sess. c. 6; NEB. Comp. STAT. (929), § 8-171, 8-172, 8-175, 8-176,
8-178, 8-179.
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concerned, with the purpose of promoting the public welfare and with
freedom in the Legislature to modify its regulation when the public
welfare was deemed to require a change. We see no reason to doubt
the power of the Legislature to extricate the banks and the administration of the guaranty fund from the serious plight in which they were
found under the operation of the old plan and to exercise a reasonable
discretion in seeking this result." 101
That the statute challenged in this case was a reasonable regulation of
the banking business, in the light of persistent bank failures and general
economic depression, seems not to be open to serious doubt. It affords an
interesting example, however, of a type of banking regulation enacted by
state legislatures which eventually falls under the judicial scrutiny of the
Supreme Court.
Federal statutes passed for the purpose of insuring safe transportation
on interstate railroad trains have been numerous and varied.' 0 2 Except
within the sphere covered by these acts, however, state lawmakers have continued to pass police regulations designed to promote the comfort and safety
of passengers on these trains. Laws have been enacted for the purpose of
eliminating grade crossings, 10 3 regulating speed,' 0 4 setting forth precautions
to be taken at highway crossings; 105 and an order of a state commission
requiring the installation of interlocking devices at grade crossings with
other railroads has been upheld. 10 6 State "full crew" laws regulating the
number of employees required to be on duty on interstate trains represent
a common form of safety regulation. 10
Such legislation has been passed
Supra note 97, at 783, 51 Sup. Ct. at 259.
Hours of Service Act, 34 STAT. 14IS' (907), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 61-64 (1928) ; Safety
Appliance Acts, 27 STAT. 531 (1893), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1928) ; 32 STAT. 943 (1903), 45
U. S. C. A. §§ 8-io (1928); 36 STAT. 298 (19I0), 45 U. S. C.A. §§ i-16 (1928); Ash Pan
Act, 35 STAT. 476 (908), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 17-21 (1928); Boiler Inspection Act, 36 STAT.
913 (I91I), 45 U. S. C. A. §§22-26, 28, 29, 31-34 (1928); as amended by act of March 4,
1915, 38 STAT. 1192, 45 U. S. C. A. 23, 30 (1928) ; July 1, I916, 39 STAT. 262; June 12, I917,
40 STAT. lo.5; June 26, 1918, 40 STAT. 616, 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 24-26 (1928) ; July I, 1g8, 40
STAT. 634; July 8, 1gS, 4a STAT. 821; July 19, 1919, 41 STAT. 163; June 5, 1920, 41 STAT.
874; March i, 192I, 41 STAT. 1i56; March 4, 1921, 41 STAT. 1367, June 12, 1922, 42 STAT.
635; Feb. i3,1923, 42 STAT. 1227; 'June 7, 1924, 43 STAT. 52r, 43 STAT. 659, 45 U. S. C. A.
§§ 22-27 (1928) ; Jan. 20, 1925, 43 STAT. 753; March 3, 1925, 43 STAT. 1198; April 22, 1926,
44 STAT. 305; Feb. II, 1927, 44 STAT. 1069; May 6, 1928, 45 STAT. 573; by the Transportation Act of 192o the Interstate Commerce Commission was given power to require the installation of automatic train stop devices on interstate railroads, see Interstate Commerce
Act, 41 STAT. 456 (1920), 45 U. S. C.A. §§ 131-146 (1928).
" Erie R. R. v. Board of Public Util. Comm'rs, 254 U. S.394, 41 Sup. Ct. 169 (1921) ;
Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 278 U. S.24, 49 Sup. Ct. 69 (928).
' Galveston, Houston & San Antonio R. R. v. Wells, I5 S. W. (2d) 46 (Tex. 1929) ;
Gillum v. Pacific Coast R. R., 152 Wash. 657, 279 Pac. 114 (1929). But cf. Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S.310, 37 Sup. Ct. 640 (1917).
' Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. R. v. White, 278 U. S.456, 49 Sup. Ct. 189
(1929) ; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. R. v. Morgan, 16o Tenn. 316, 24 S.W. (2d)
898 (1929).
' International & Great Northern R. R. v. Railroad Com.. of Texas, 275 U. S.503, 48
Sup. Ct. 155 (1926), aft' 296 S.W. 330 (Tex. 1926).
m' See the footnote to the Court's opinion in Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Norwood, 283
U. S.248, at 256, si Sup. Ct. 458, at 462 (I931). Thirteen states are listed as having such
laws in addition to those of Arkansas, under consideration in this case.
"
'
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upon favorably by the Supreme Court. 08 These decisions, however, were
handed down prior to the Transportation Act. of I920, which greatly expanded the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Norwood 109 the company sued the attorney general
and the prosecuting attorneys of two circuits of Arkansas to enjoin the
enforcement of statutes of that state regulating freight train crews and
switching crews, claiming that they violated the equal protection, due process
and commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution. The state laws in question had previously been upheld by the Supreme Court as against a similar
claim of repugnancy to these clauses of the Constitution. 1 1 It was contended
that changes in railroad operating conditions since these Supreme Court
decisions had made the laws unreasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and that the increased powers given to the Interstate Commerce Commission
by the Transportation Act of 1920 had deprived the states of power to
legislate in this field. From a decree of the federal district court for the
western district of Arkansas dismissing the case on the ground that the
complaint failed to show sufficient ground for relief,"" an appeal was taken
to the Supreme Court.
Answering the complainant's contention that the present operating
conditions on its railroad in Arkansas and elsewhere, and on railroads
generally in the country, differed in important particulars from those existing in 1907 and 1913, when these laws were passed, the Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Butler, said:
"There is no showing that the dangers against which these laws
were intended to safeguard employees and the public no longer exist or
have been lessened by the improvements in road and equipment or by
the changes in operating conditions there described. And, for aught that
appears from the facts that are alleged, the same or greater need may
now exist for the specified number of brakemen and helpers in freight
train and switching crews. It is not made to appear that the expense
of complying with the state laws is now relatively more burdensome
than formerly. Greater train loading tends to lessen operating expenses for brakemen. There is no statement as to present efficiency
of switching crews compared with that when the 1913 Act was passed,
but it reasonably may be inferred that larger cars and heavier loading
of today make for a lower switching expense per car or ton. While
cost of complying with state laws enacted to promote safety is an
element properly to be taken into account in determining whether such
laws are arbitrary and repugnant to the due process clause of the Four3

' Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. R. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 31 Sup. Ct. 275
(I91I) ; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern R. R. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 36 Sup. 443
(1916).
10 Supra note 107, noted in (931)
31 CoL L. REv. lO4O, (1931) 40 YA E L. J. iioi.
See also on this subject (1931) 31 CoL L. REV. 450.
'Supra note io8.

i42

F.

(2d)

765 (W. D. Ark. I93O).

SUPREME COURT AND STATE ACTION UNDER i4th AMENDMENT

511

teenth Amendment . . ., there is nothing alleged in that respect which

is sufficient to distinguish this case from those in which we have upheld
the laws in question." 112
With respect to the commerce clause, it was said that the Transportation Act
of 19:2o had not changed the situation, since Congress had not empowered
the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix the number of men to be employed in train or switching crews." 3
The power of state legislatures to create boards or commissions for
the purpose of exercising their power of regulation over railroads has been
sustained in many decisions," 4 subject, however, to the limitations that these
commissions cannot be vested with strictly legislative 115 or judicial powers

116

and that their proceedings must be within the constitutional safeguards relating to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, 1't7 and that a
state cannot authorize a railroad commission to regulate interstate commerce.1 1 Orders or regulations of state commissions, therefore, whether
imposed by statute or ordinance, and though issued under the guise of the
police power, must be "reasonable", not "arbitrary", and must bear some
"reasonable" and "substantial" relation to the legislative enactments under
which they are issued." 9 The Supreme Court is, of course, the arbiter of the
issue of the "reasonableness" of these administrative orders, and two cases
involving such questions were decided during the 1930 term.
In Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co. v. Holmberg 120 the Court held that an order of the state railway commission of
Nebraska requiring the railroad to construct an underground pass under a
grade crossing on defendant's farm (which was divided approximately in half
by the plaintiff's track) constituted a taking of property without due process
of law. The railroad commission had acted in pursuance of a Nebraska
3'Supra note lO7, at ;255, 5, Sup. Ct. at 461.
"'Supranote lO7, at 256, 51 Sup. Ct. at 462.
" See, for example, Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S.307, 6 Sup. Ct. 334
(1886) ; New York & New England R. R. v. Town of Bristol, 1SI U. S.556, 14 Sup. Ct. 437
(1894) ; McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U. S.543, 26 Sup. Ct. 722 (19o6) : Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. l047 (1894) ; People v. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Ry., 223 Ill.
581, 79 N. E. 144 Igo6).
' Georgia R. R. v. Smith, 7o Ga. 694 (1883) ; State v. Great Northern Ry., Ioo Minn.
445, III N. W. 289 (I9O7).
' Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 462

(I890).

' Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, supra note 116; Mercantile Trust
Co. v. Texas and Pacific Ry., 5I Fed. 529 (1892).
'Houston & Texas Central Ry. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 26 Sup. Ct. 491 (1906);

American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 365 (I9O4) ; Mobile & Ohio

R. R.2 v. Sessions, 28 Fed. 592 (1886).
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis, 238 Fed. 384 (I916).
'282 U. S. 162, 51 Sup. Ct. 56 (ig3o), noted in (931)
ig Gro. L. R.v.381; discussed
in Powell, State Utilities and the Supreme Court, i922-193o (1931) 29 MICHi. L. RaV. I0OI,
at ioio.
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statute 121 which had delegated to it authority to order farm crossings underground if circumstances warranted. The supreme court of Nebraska had
sustained the order. 1 22 The Court spoke through Mr. Justice Stone a§
follows:
"It is plain that the commission proceeded upon the assumption
that the statute authorized it to compel plaintiff to establish the underground pass for the convenience and benefit of defendant in the use
of his own property, and that that alone was the ground and purpose
of the order. The application thus given to the statute deprives plaintiff of property for the private use and benefit of defendant, and is a
taking of property without due process of law, forbidden by the Four-

teenth Amendment."

123

In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Railway Commission
of California124 the Supreme Court was asked to pass upon the validity of
an order of the railroad commission of California requiring the construction
by the appellant railway company of a union passenger station in the city of
Los Angeles, together with incidental connections, extensions, improvements
and terminal facilities, in substantial compliance with a plan outlined by
the commission. This order, the Court held, was not only not in conflict
with powers vested by Congress in the Interstate Commerce Commission,
but was not a deprivation of the property of the railroads without due process
of law or a denial to them of the equal protection of the laws. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, however, dissented on the ground that the commission's
order was "arbitrary, unreasonable, and beyond any power which the state
is competent to confer". 125 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes said:
"The principle that the state, directly or through an authorized
commission, may require railroad companies to provide reasonably adequate and suitable facilities for the convenience of the communities
served by them, has frequently been applied. . . . The question in each
case is whether, in the light of the facts disclosed, the regulation is
essentially an unreasonable one ...
. . . The inadequacy of existing facilities has been shown and
the relative merits of various plans have been the subject of elaborate
study. The expense involved in the plan adopted, when considered in
relation to the importance of the interests affected and to be served,
does not appear to be so large as to warrant the condemnation of the
plan as unreasonable and beyond the authority of the state." 126
NEB. CoMP. STAT. (1922) § 5527, as amended by Neb. Laws 1923, c. 167.
11s Neb. 727, 214 N. W. 746 (1927).
'Supra
note 12o, at 167, 5I Sup. Ct. at 57.
121283 U. S. 380, 51 Sup. Ct. 553 (93).
'

IIbid. 397, 51 Sup. Ct. at 558.
126Ibid. 394-96, 51 Sup. Ct. at 557-58.
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In Railway Express Agency v. Virginia 12 7 the Supreme Court held
valid a provision of the constitution of Virginia 128 requiring a foreign corporation to take out a charter within the state in order to engage in intrastate express business. The appellant was a Delaware corporation given by
its charter power to engage in international, interstate, and intrastate express
business. Its right to do interstate business had not been questioned, but
the supreme court of appeals of Virginia had affirmed 129 an order of the
Virginia corporation commission refusing appellant's application to engage
in intrastate business, unless it incorporated as a domestic corporation, on
the ground that being a foreign corporation created since the constitution
went into effect, it was prohibited by that instrument from doing intrastate
business. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Holmes declared that there
was no substantial evidence that the requirement imposed a burden on interstate commerce and dismissed as "inaccurate" the objection based on the
Fourteenth Amendment that the provision operated to deprive the appellant
of its right to sue in the federal courts and to remove suits to them on the
ground of diversity of citizenship. He said:
"The appellant is not deprived of any rights. It can do all that
it ever could. If it sees fit to acquire a new personality under the laws
of Virginia it cannot complain that the new person has not the same
rights as itself." 130
It seems now to be settled that citizens of the United States, corporate
or incorporate, have a constitutional right, in proper cases, to resort to the
federal courts, and that any state law exacting from them a waiver of the
exercise of their right as a condition to theif being allowed to do business
within the state, is void. 1 31 In Terralv. Burke Construction Co. the reason
for the rule was set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Taft as follows:
"The principle does not depend for its application on the character
of the business the corporation does, whether state or interstate, although
that has been suggested as a distinction in some cases. It rests on
the ground that the federal Constitution confers upon citizens of one
state the right to resort to federal courts in another, that state action,
whether legislative or executive, necessarily calculated to curtail the free
exercise of the right thus secured is void because the sovereign power of
a state in excluding foreign corporations, as in the exercise of all others
of its sovereign powers, is subject to the limitations of the supreme
fundamental law." 132
U. S. 440, 51 Sup. Ct. 201 (i931), noted in (1931) 31 CoL L. REV. 497, (1931)
490, (1931) 44 HRv. L. REv. 11ii, (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 11o3, (1931) 79 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 1141. See also Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. iii9.
3-7 2 8 2

ig Gro. L. REV.
'VA.
'

CONST. (1902)

§ 163.

153 Va. 498, 150 S. E. 419 (1929).
Supra note 127, at 444, 51 Sup. Ct.

at 202.
mTerral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. I88 (922).
Ibid. 532, 42 Sup. Ct. at I8q.
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In the instant Virginia case it may be argued that there was an attempt
by the state, in requiring foreign corporations, as a condition to engaging in
intrastate business to incorporate as domestic corporations, to accomplish
indirectly what dearly it could not accomplish directly. The Supreme -Court,
however, as we have seen, specifically repudiated such an interpretation of
Virginia's action. If the foreign corporation, acting upon the state's suggestion, becomes a domestic one, it cannot, says the Court, be heard to
complain that it has lost any rights. 133 Against such a view it may be urged
not only that it is at seeming variance with the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions but that it suffers from the vice of attaching too much significance
to a legal fiction in disregard of economic realities.' 3 4 On the other hand,
there are cogent arguments in favor of preserving intact the state's power
to exclude foreign corporations which need not be dwelt upon here. As
Chief Judge Cardozo once said in another connection: "There are dangers
in any choice." 135
In Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson 136 the Court upheld a Texas statute 137

allowing suits against private corporations to be brought in any county in
which the cause of action arose.' 38 The legislation was contested upon the
ground that it constituted a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In
answer to this argument Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too
literal. We must remember that the machinery of government would
not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints. In deciding
whether a corporation is denied the equal protection of the laws when
its creator establishes a more extensive venue for actions against it
than are fixed for private titizens we have to consider not a geometrical
equation between a corporation and a man but whether the difference
does injustice to the class generally, even though it bear hard in some
particular case, which is not alleged or proved here." 139
The Court also pointed out that the reasonableness of the provision was
made more probable by the fact that it had been adopted and sustained in
140
several other states.

'

Supra note 130.

'See

HENDERSON, POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW (1918); BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928); Merrill, UnConditions (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rm. 879.
constitutional
' People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 15o N. E. 585 (1926).

2 8 2 U. S. 499, 5I Sup. Ct. 228 (1931).
STEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) art. 1995, §:23.
' The legislation had previously been sustained by the court o.fcivil appeals for the
eleventh district of Texas. See ig S. W. (2d) 2o3 (I929)."
' Supra note 136, at 501, 51 Sup. Ct. at 229.

a

'The following cases were cited by the Court in support of this statement: Grayburg
Oil Co. v. Powell, 118 Tex. 3.54, 15 S. W. (2d) 542 (1929) ; Lewis v. South Pacific Coast
R. R., 66 Cal. 209, .5 Pac, 79 (1884) ; Cook v. W. S. Ray Mfg. Co., 159 Cal. 694, 115 Pac.
318 (1911) ; Central Georgia Power Co. v. Stubbs, 1W1 Ga. 172, 8o S. E. 636 (1913) ; Begley v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 252 S. W. 84 (Mo. Supp. 1923) ; Merrimac Veneer Co.
v. McCalip, 129 Miss. 671, 92 So. 817 (1922).
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In Herron v. Southern Pacific Co.141 the Supreme Court answered two
questions certified to it by the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit
arising out of an action brought in the federal district court of Arizona to
recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a collision between the
plaintiff's automobile and the defendant's train. In answer to the first it
said that the state of Arizona might, without violating the due process clause
of the United States Constitution, require by constitutional provision that
the defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk should in all
cases be left to the jury. In answer to the second, however, it said that
where, in such an action, the evidence of contributory negligence or assumption of risk was conclusive and the question was one of law, the judge had
the right and duty to direct a verdict for the defendant. It was pointed out
that the controlling principle governing the decision was that state laws could
not alter the essential character or functions of a federal court. "The function of the trial judge in a federal court", Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said, "is
not in any sense a local matter, and state statutes which would interfere with
the appropriate performance of that function are not binding upon the
federal court under either the Conformity Act or the 'Rules of Decision'
Act." 142 The view accepted by the Court that the Arizona provision pertains to the functions of the trial judge in presiding over trials and is therefore not binding on federal courts is supported by legal precedents. 1 43 It
is nevertheless open to the objection that in a very real sense the provision
may be said to operate as a substantial modification of the substantive law,
and therefore would seem to come within the scope of the "Rules of Decision

Act."

144

The question of whether or not the concept of due process of law
requires that a corporation sued on a judgment be permitted to set up, as
a defense thereto, want of jurisdiction, on which ground it had unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the original action in which the judgment was
rendered, was answered in the negative in Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling M11en's
Association. 45 Here the first suit was begun in a Missouri state court and
removed to the federal district court for western Missouri, 'vhere judgment
was rendered against the corporation. To the defense of want of jurisdiction
set up by the respondent in a suit upon the judgment in the federal district
court for southern Iowa, it was contended by the petitioner that such a
in1283 U. S. 91, .51 Sup. Ct. 383 (I93i), noted in (1931)
ILL. L. REV. 322, ('931) 29 MIcH. L. REv. io8o.

31 CoL. L. REv. 1046, (1931) 26

" Ibid. at 94, 51 Sup. at 384.
Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 (8W6) ; McElsee v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 3o2 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895) ; Lincoln v. Power, I5 U. S. 436, 14 Sup.
Ct. 387 (1894); Mexican Central Ry. v. Glover, 107 Fed. 356 (C. C. A. 5th, I9OI); Yates
v. Whyel Coke Co., 221 Fed. 6o3 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915) ; Vicksburg & Meridian R. R. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 7 Sup. Ct. I (1886); Bowditch v. Boston, IOi U. S. I6 (1879).
'"This suggestion is made in (193I) 31 COL. L. REV. 1O46.
""283 U. S. 522, 5i Sup. Ct. 517 (193I).
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defense constituted a collateral attack and a retrial of an issue settled in the
first suit. The overruling of this objection and the resulting judgment for
1 46
The respondent,
the respondent corporation were assigned as error.
however, insisted that to deprive it of the defense which it made in the court
below of lack of jurisdiction over it by the Missouri district court, would
be a denial of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court. Mr. Justice
Roberts, in announcing its opinion, said that there was involved in the due
process doctrine no right to litigate the same question twice. He continued:
"The substantial matter for determination is whether the judgment amounts to res judicata on the question of the jurisdiction of the
court which rendered it over the person of the respondent ...
"Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those
who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest;
and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply
in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is
fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause." 147
In Smith v. Cahoon 148 the appellant, a private carrier for hire, was
charged with operating vehicles upon the highways in Florida, without having obtained the certificate of public convenience and necessity and paying
the tax required under the state statute. 149 The Act provided for the regulation, through the state railroad commission, of "auto transportation companies", which were defined to include all companies operating motor vehicles
between fixed termini and over regular routes, with the exception of
taxicabs and certain hotel busses and those exclusively engaged in transporting children to or from school or in carrying farm products and fish enroute
to primary markets.' 5 ° From the state supreme court's judgment 151 reversing an order of the circuit court discharging the petitioner, an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court on the ground that the statute, as applied
to appellant, was repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In an opinion holding the statute invalid, Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes said:
". .. we entertain no doubt of the power of the state to insist
upon suitable protection for the public against injuries through the
"I4o F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 8th, 193o).
"'Supranote 145, at 524-26, 51 Sup. Ct. at 517-18.
its283 U. S. 553, 5, Sup. Ct. 582 (ig3i), noted in (1931) 31 CoL L. Rxv. 1194.
" Fla. Laws 1929, c. 13700. Because of the taxation feature involved, this case might
have been considered in the first section of this paper.
(h). 128 So. 632 (I93O).
§ i1174,
in' 99 Fbid.
Fla.
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operation on its highways of carriers for hire, whether they are common
carriers or private carriers. But, in establishing such a regulation,
there does not appear to be the slightest justification for making a
distinction between those who carry for hire farm products, or milk or
butter, or fish or oysters, and those who carry for hire bread or sugar,
or tea or coffee, or groceries in general, or other useful commodities.
So far as the statute was designed to safeguard the public with respect to
the use of the highways, we think that the discrimination it makes
between the private carriers which are relieved of the necessity of
obtaining certificates and giving security, and a carrier such as the
appellant, was wholly arbitrary, and constituted a violation of the appellant's constitutional right." 152
The Court reacted differently to the contention raised in Wampler v.
Lecompte 153 that a game law of Maryland "4 was invalid in that the state's
power of classification had been exercised unreasonably. The statute provided that no duck blind might be placed at a greater distance from the shore
than three hundred yards, and that blinds must be at least five hundred yards
apart, but conferred a preferential right upon the riparian owner to select
the position for a blind, providing he did not place it "within two hundred
and fifty yards of the dividing line of any property owned by him and the
adjoining property bordering on said waters . . .unless with the consent
of the adjoining landowner". In sustaining this statute Mr. Justice Brandeis
declared:
"The purpose of the legislation is, as the court found, 'the conservation of water fowl and the protection and safety of those engaged
in shooting them. The necessity for such regulation is apparent, for,
if blinds could be erected in broad waters at any distance from the
shore without regard to the distance separating them, it would not only
be conducive to the destruction and annihilation of ducks and other
water fowl, but extremely dangerous to those shooting them.'
There was obviously no intention to discriminate in favor of persons
having a large water frontage; for the consent provision enables owners
of small frontages to join in erecting blinds spaced the requisite distance
apart." 155
In the two cases last referred to, as in so many others considered in this
paper, the problems of the "reasonableness" of the legislative classifications
which the Court had to consider were of the type requiring for their solution
the exercise of judicial discretion with respect to practical matters. It would
seem that in Smitl v. Cahoon the chief trouble was that sufficient data had
not been marshalled in support of the reasonableness of the discrimination
__Supra

note 148, at 567, 5, Sup. Ct. at 587.

:282 U. S. 172, 51 Sup. Ct. 92 (,930).
: MD. ANN. CODE (Supp. 1929)' art. 99, §§ 40, 47; Md. Laws 1927, c. 568,
amended by Md. Laws 1929, c. 366, §§ 39-41.
I Supra note 153, at 174, 51 Sup. Ct. at 92-93.
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complained of. That there may have been adequate justification for a
classification of that sort is a not wholly untenable supposition. Mr. Justice
Holmes might even have been expected to act upon such an assumption, in
view of the language employed by him in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v. May, 5 6 where a Texas law permitting owners of land contiguous
to railroads to sue the roads for penalties for allowing Johnson grass or
Russian thistle to go to seed upon their rights of way, was challenged under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In announcing the Court's opinion in that case,
sustaining the constitutionality of the law, he said:
". .. we feel unable to say that the law before us may not have
been justified by local conditions. It would have been more obviously
fair to extend the regulation at least to highways. But it may have
been found, for all that we know, that the seed of Johnson grass is
dropped from the cars in such quantities as to cause special trouble.
It may be that the neglected strips occupied by railroads afford a ground
where noxious weeds especially flourish, and that whereas self-interest
leads the owners of farms to keep down pests, the railroad companies
have done nothing in a matter which concerns their neighbors only.
Other reasons may be imagined. Great constitutional provisions must
be administered with caution. Some play must be allowed for the joints
of the machine, and it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great
a degree as the courts."
In Smith v. Cahoon, however, Justice Holmes' imagination was not so
active and he joined his colleagues in extending aid and comfort to Mr.
Smith.
In Wampler v. Lecompte, as in Smith v. Cahoon, the state supreme court
had upheld the constitutionality of the legislative classification. 15 7 In the
Wampier case, however, the motives underlying the classification were
obvious, or at any rate were made clear to the Court, since it declared that
ccno fact is shown on which to base the contention" that the power had been
"exercised unreasonably". In Smith v. Cahoon the social justification, if
any, for the legislative policy was beneath the surface, and the state's action
was viewed as "wholly arbitrary".'" 8 It will be recalled that in O'Gorman
and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Mr. Justice Brandeis declared that "As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." '" In borderline cases, however, unless the social and
economic policy motivating the legislative classification is brought clearly
194 U. S. 267, 24 Sup. Ct. 638 (1904).
159 Md. 222, 15o AtI. 455 (1930).
Supra note 148, at 567, 51 Sup. Ct. at 587.
Supra note 86, at 257-58, 51 Sup. Ct. at 132.
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into view and some justification of it attempted, it is by no means certain that
the "presumption of constitutionality" will always be sufficient to prevent the
legislation from receiving judicial disapprobation-and this in spite of the
fact that the Court is probably now more "liberal" in its complexion than at
any time within the last quarter of a century.
Conclusion
In the nine cases considered in the foregoing review in which the constitutionality of state action in the domain of taxation was challenged under
the Fourteenth Amendment, three attempted exercises of such power were
invalidated. In only Coolidge v. Long '0o-the case which decided against
the constitutionality of the Massachusetts inheritance tax law-was there
sharp division among the justices. Here the vote was five to four, Chief
Justice Hughes joining Justices Butler, Sutherland, Van Devanter and McReynolds in forming the majority against Justices Roberts, Holmes, Brandeis
and Stone. The issues involved in Beidler v. South CarolinaTax Commission 101 had in effect been settled during the preceding term of the Court
in the cases of FarmersLoan & Trust Co. v. Mi;Zesota 102 and Baldwin v.
Missouri,'0 3 in which the Court, expressly overruling Blackstone v. Miller 104
and inferentially repudiating several other cases, declared that the due process
clause afforded protection against double taxation by the states. In the
Beidler case, which held unconstitutional South Carolina's action in imposing
an inheritance tax on indebtedness in the form of advances and dividends
due from a South Carolina corporation to a non-resident stockholder, Justices
Holmes and Brandeis bowed to the force of numbers "without repeating
reasoning that did not prevail with the Court". Justice Holmes' vigorous
dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri had already warned against the consequences
of the "ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting
down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States". In the
only other decision in which a state's attempt to exercise its taxing power was
rendered nugatory-Hans Rees' Sons, Inc., v. North Carolina'0 -there

was no difference of opinion. In State Board of Tax Commissioners of In0 -the
diana v. Jackson 16'
decision sustaining the constitutionality of a state
law imposing graduated license fees on the operators of chain stores-the
division among the justices was five to four, Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Roberts, Holmes, Brandeis and Stone comprising the majority, against
Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler.
'oSupra note 46.
"'Supra note 43.
'

Supra note 30.

Supra note 36.
.. Supra note 32.
" Supra note 61.
'Supra
note io.
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Of the remaining thirteen cases discussed in this paper in which some
form of state action was attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment, in only
four was the state's attempt to exercise its police power completely frustrated.
In Stromberg v. California16 7 Miss Stromberg's constitutional right to waive

a red flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government", was affirmed as against state legislation which sought to deny it.
Only Justices McReynolds and Butler were dissatisfied with this conclusion.
But in Near v. Minnesota,68 in which the Court was called upon to consider
the effort of the lawmakers of that state to impose certain far-reaching
restrictions upon the liberty of the press, the division was five to four. Chief
Justice Hughes, speaking for his colleagues-Justices Holmes, Brandeis,
Stone and Roberts--described the restraints imposed under the operation of
the challenged statute as constituting the "essence of censorship". Justice
Butler wrote a forceful dissenting opinion in which Justices Sutherland, Van
Devanter and McReynolds concurred. That an order of the railway commission of Nebraska which required a railroad to construct an underground
pass under a grade crossing on Mr. Holmberg's farm was an unconstitutional
deprivation of the property of the railroad without due process of law, was
decided, without any division of opinion, in Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis
and Omaha Railway Co. v. Holmberg.'69 The reasonableness of the order of
the railroad commission of California requiring the construction by the
railways of a union passenger station in Los Angeles, however, was apparent
to all members of the Court except Mr. Justice McReynolds, who thought
that it was "arbitrary, unreasonable, and beyond any power which the state
is competent to confer".1 70 In Smith v. Cahoon .71 the attempted regulation
by Florida of so-called "auto transportation companies" which excepted
taxicabs, certain hotel busses and those exclusively engaged in transporting
children to or from school or in carrying farm products and fish enroute
to primary markets, was considered by a unanimous Court to be repugnant
to the due process and equal protection clauses. In Herron v. Southern
Pacific Co., 172 the Court held that while the state of Arizona might constitutionally require that the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk be left to the jury, a federal judge could nevertheless direct a
verdict for the defendant when the evidence was conclusive and the question
one of law. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, said that the
theory of the decision was that state laws could not alter the essential character or functions of a federal court. Sharp division of opinion marked the
107Supra note 78.
" Supra note 73.
Supra note 120.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Railway Comm. of California, supra note
'17

Supra note 148.

'Supra

note 141.
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consideration by the Court of the New Jersey law attacked in O'Gorman
and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. 1 73 The regulation of the
amounts of the commissions to be paid agents of fire insurance companies
provided for in the statute received the approval of Chief Justice Hughes and
of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Roberts, but drew the judicial
fire of Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, who
announced their views in a "separate opinion". In no other cases were
dissenting opinions recorded.
The validity of Mr. Justice Holmes' famous dictum that "general propositions do not decide concrete cases" and that "the decision will depend on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise" 174
is confirmed by study and analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States in cases where federal and state action has been challenged
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The cases discussed in this
paper constitute, of course, merely an exceedingly small portion of a constantly expanding fabric of "constitutional law" that is being fashioned into
shape from year to year by the operation of the federal judicial process. The
sharp cleavage among the justices along lines of social and economic policy
is apparent, however, in a study even as limited in scope and treatment as the
present. Because the issues in due process and equal protection cases involve
at bottom problems of political and social control, it is extremely essential, in
the forceful words of Professor Frankfurter, to "face the fact that five
justices of the Supreme Court are molders of policy, rather than impersonal
vehicles of revealed truth". 17The right of the Supreme Court to pass final judgment upon the reasonableness of legislative and administrative action, as illustrated in its review
of rates, of classifications for purposes of taxation, and of other regulations
designed to control public service corporations and industries said to be
"affected with a public interest", is a power of tremendous and far-reaching
import. It needs to be exercised by men whose training, experience and
understanding in the broad field of the social sciences is as varied and comprehensive in scope as is their knowledge of legal precedents.
'
17

Supra note 86.

Dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (195o).
The Supreme Court and the Public (1930) 83 FoRum MAGAZiE at 334.

